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"“The Animal” After Derrida: Interrogating the Bioethics of Geno-Cide"
ABSTRACT
Bioethics tends to be dominated by discourses concerned with the ethical dimension of
medical practice, the organization of medical care, and the integrity of biomedical
research involving human subjects and animal testing. Jacques Derrida has explored the
fundamental question of the “limit” that identifies and differentiates the human animal
from the nonhuman animal. However, to date his work has not received any reception in
the field of biomedical ethics. In this paper, I examine what Derrida’s thought about this
limit might mean for the use/misuse/abuse of animals in contemporary biomedical
research. For this, I review Derrida’s analysis and examine what it implies for scientific
responsibility, introducing what I have coined the “Incompleteness Theorem of Bioethics.”
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article défend la thèse que l'idée de la dignité humaine a un sens précis et philoso
La bioéthique a tendance à être dominée par des discours centrés sur la dimension morale
de la pratique médicale, l’organisation des soins médicaux et l’intégrité des recherches
biomédicales sur des sujets humains et sur des animaux. Jacques Derrida a exploré la
question fondamentale de la « limite » qui identifie et différencie l’animal humain de
l’animal non humain. Pourtant, son œuvre n’a pas encore trouvé résonance dans le
domaine de l’éthique biomédicale. Il s’agit ici d’examiner, à la lumière de la pensée de
Derrida sur cette limite, les questions de l’utilisation des animaux, de leur maltraitance et
de la cruauté à leur égard dans la recherche biomédicale contemporaine. Dans ce docu-
ment, je passe en revue l’analyse de Derrida et considère ses implications en matière de
responsabilité scientifique, présentant de ce fait ce que j’appelle le « Théorème de l’in-
complétude de la bioéthique ».
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“THE ANIMAL” AFTER DERRIDA: INTERROGATING 
THE BIOETHICS OF GENO-CIDE
NORMAN SWAZO
COLLEGE OF SCIENCE & GENERAL STUDIES
ALFAISAL UNIVERSITY
One understands a philosopher only by heeding closely
what he means to demonstrate, and in reality fails to
demonstrate, concerning the limit between human and ani-
mal.
Jacques Derrida
I am on principle sympathetic with those who, it seems to
me, are in the right and have good reasons to rise up
against the way animals are treated: in industrial produc-
tion, in slaughter, in consumption, in experimentation.
Jacques Derrida
In his thoughts, Herman spoke a eulogy for the mouse who
had shared a portion of her life with him and who, because
of him, had left this earth. What do they know—all these
scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders of the
world—about such as you? They have convinced them-
selves that man, the worst transgressor of all the species, is
the crown of creation. All other creatures were created
merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented,
exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for
the animals it is an eternal Treblinka.
Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Letter Writer
THE QUESTION AT ISSUE
Bioethics tends to be dominated by discourses concerned with the ethical dimen-
sion of medical practice, medical care organization and research integrity.
Accounting for the work of Jacques Derrida, and with reference to Michel Fou-
cault’s deliberations about biopower, Cary Wolfe has rightly questioned the
entrenched discursive features of bioethics as a discipline according to which
the boundary between the human and the non-human remains “an ethical
(non)issue” (Wolfe, 2009). Following Carl Elliot’s Wittgensteinian queries about
the language-game dominant in contemporary bioethics, Wolfe finds it impor-
tant that bioethics be concerned with “the sense or meaning of life.” In other
words, bioethics should examine the prejudices that are “based on species dif-
ference” and “species membership,” and hence take up the central issue of “our
obligations to nonhuman animals.” For Wolfe, this means doing philosophy dif-
ferently, in particular by moving away from the analytic tradition of bioethics
discourse that carries with it “a certain estranging operation of language,” and
thereby to move beyond a humanist ethics to a post-humanist (even anti-anthro-
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pocentrist) discourse. But here, Derrida’s statement should be interrogated to
the effect that he has never believed “in some homogenous continuity between
what calls itself man and what he calls the animal” (Wolfe, 2009, p. 83).
To pursue this question, however, means that our movement in language should
be more radical than what has been undertaken to date, in which case we may
well have to rectify our language by eschewing the very concepts “human” and
“nonhuman,” as well as the more basic concept “animal,” which has its prove-
nance in the Latin renditions of classical Greek philosophical nomenclature. This
means going beyond Heidegger’s claim (following Nietzsche) that the relation
of rationality and animality remains “as yet undetermined,” to the point of
eschewing the presupposed validity of the duality as well as the hope of clarify-
ing the humanitas of the human while retaining this duality. If we do this, then
it seems reasonable to undertake a thought experiment, even a life experiment,
that welcomes intuitive insight and  according to which “the animal” can be
engaged from the outset as a being that stands before us as one that is “to be
heard morally” (as Wolfe puts it), regardless of one’s ontology or conception of
justice (e.g., rights, duty).
At issue here, then, is what Derrida means to demonstrate concerning the “limit”
(an “indivisible threshold”) or, better said, the limits, between humans and ani-
mals, and thereby the problem of force and right to be clarified at a given limit
of distinction and disclosure. At issue are the “logics of closure and enclosure”—
conceptual and material—of living beings. Derrida examines this idea of limit
as an oppositional limit. That is, the conceptual category of “the human” is
opposed to the conceptual category of “the animal” so as to blur, rather than to
clarify, multiplicities of differences that can and should be taken into account
(Derrida, 1983, p. 183). To speak of limits is to recognize, as Derrida (2004)
insists, that “there is not one opposition between man and non-man; there are,
between different organizational structures of the living being, many fractures,
heterogeneities, differential structures.” What is blurred conceptually is blurred
in practice, i.e., in the practical relation of humans to animals. Thus, at issue
here is what Derrida’s thought about this limit means for bioethics, specifically
with regard to the use/misuse/abuse of animals in contemporary biomedical
research.
To this end, I propose what I have coined the “Incompleteness Theorem of
Bioethics.” The theorem holds that: (A) In any well-formed theory of the ethi-
cal, the truth of some moral propositions is undecidable within the frame of the
theory, in which case (B) it is obligatory that one endure the undecidable as unde-
cidable, rather than posit a simulacrum of truth that, in consequence, violates
the principle of non-maleficence that applies to all living beings. The following
discussion seeks to provide an account of moral analysis that justifies this theo-
rem as fundamental to biomedical practice involving animal research.
To say “specifically” above is to signal a call to attend to the violence done by
humans in the use/misuse/abuse of an unstated number of animal species. A
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working group of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics estimates “the annual num-
ber of animals used in biomedical research worldwide” to be “between 50–100
million, with a forecast increase in number due to advances in genetic research”
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005, p. 7). As the working group recognizes the
linkage of scientific justification and moral justification, it focused on two ques-
tions that should guide ethical review: (1) whether animal research yields use-
ful knowledge that could not be gained from other sources; and (2) whether it is
morally acceptable for humans to use animals in ways that cause them harm
(p. 33). Fundamental to these two issues is the question of whether there is “a
prima facie ethical duty to help alleviate suffering [human or animal] through
acts, provided research efforts are in proportion to the extent of suffering to be
alleviated.” But, the working group conceded that “[i]t remains unresolved at
this stage as to whether such an obligation automatically sanctions the use of
animals” (p. 36).
Indeed, this latter question presupposes some settlement as to the moral status of
animals, in the sense that an animal may be considered a member of a moral
community, in which case an animal would be considered either a moral agent
(i.e., a being “able to behave in a moral way and […] liable to moral criticism for
any failure to do so”) or a moral subject (i.e., a being “whose features should be
taken into account in the behaviour of moral agents”), or even both, depending
on context of evaluation (p. 39).
The ostensible moral status of an animal merits inquiry in as much as Derrida
speaks of “the genocidal torture” that is inflicted on animals “in a way that is fun-
damentally perverse, that is, by raising en masse, in a hyperindustrialized fash-
ion, herds that are to be massively exterminated for alleged human needs […]”
(Derrida, 2004). In post-Derridean discourse, such use/misuse/abuse would be
assessed as geno-cide (not to say “Holocaust,” which, in the sense of “Shoah,”
has a combined religious and political connotation) as well as torture—terms no
longer restricted to reference to an event or act designated “a crime against
humanity” under conventions of international law1. With Derrida, the limit of
geno-cide is now to be interrogated in terms of the limit(s) between the human
and the animal, in the event of what may stand out as a crime (or crimes) against
the animal (animals), even while one may continue to speak of genocide as a
crime against humanity.
The concept of a “crime against an animal,” of course, presupposes an applica-
ble law. Yet, “law” itself is here in question, because here one cannot mean a
merely positive law which has its source (its posit-ing) in human appropriation—
or, more precisely, expropriation, arrogation, thus the human arrogance—of
sovereignty over the whole of nature and thus over animals in general. Such law
forcibly (i.e., as a matter of force, in contrast to right) privileges the human inter-
est over the animal interest as such insofar as the human declares himself (by
self-definition) to be singularly the “political animal,” accent here on “politi-
cal” with all that this entails in the language of subjection, subordination and
sovereignty. All other animals, said to be capable of social relationships, thus to
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be living beings capable of association (koinonia, as with Aristotle’s analysis) are
nonetheless declared to be “apolitical” (apolis for Aristotle, or “in a state of
nature” for Hobbes). For both ancient Greek and especially modern European
political philosophy, 
If one cannot make a convention with the beast […] it is for reason of lan-
guage. The beast does not understand our language […] [There] could not
be an exchange, shared speech, question and response, proposition and
response, as any contract, convention, or covenant seems to demand. (Der-
rida, 2009, p. 55) 
But, here we have nothing more than a postulate, which Derrida calls “some-
thing profoundly thetical and dogmatic,” even “the most powerful, impassive,
and dogmatic prejudice about the animal,” (p. 55) this privileging of human 
language in the encounter with the animal, this logocentrism that excludes the
animal(s) from “response.” Against such political-philosophical propositions,
Derrida asserts: 
[…] I in fact think, that all that is brutally false, that it is false to say that
beasts in general (supposing any such thing to exist) or so-called brute
beasts (what does “brute” mean?) do not understand our language, do not
respond or do not enter into any convention. (2009, p. 56, italics added) 
Derrida goes even further to assert, in stark challenge to the modern political-
philosophical expropriations of sovereignty, that he does not believe sovereign-
ty is proper to man (p. 57).
Hence, Derrida would have us know that, “every law is not necessarily ethical,
juridical, or political,” in which case it remains to be clarified what “law” means
when assigning a significance to the event of a crime against an animal, and
even more so when this crime is determined to be geno-cide (p. 16). Crime
against the animal, originating in the so-called rational animal through the force
of his law, presupposes rationality and/or animality at the root of such crime.
But, if crime and cruelty transcend animality, as Derrida says, the crime against
the animal cannot be a matter of animality in man but instead an event that issues
from his reason and his rational power, and thus from the rationality that osten-
sibly legitimates the human sovereign.
However, notwithstanding what has been said above, one must point to a caveat
here because, as David Wood puts it, “[T]he use of the word ‘animal’ or ‘the
animal’ to refer to any and all living creatures is [already] a conceptual violence
that expeditiously legitimates our actual violence” (Wood, 2004, p. 133). One
cannot ignore the significance of the origin of this violence as conceptual.
Wood’s commentary on Derrida’s solicitude for “the animal” points to a ques-
tion that we may reasonably engage in as a thought experiment, even if, as Wood
says, this presents itself as an “unfashionable thought”: Can we “imagine valu-
ing another life-system” that has all the properties of such a system yet that does
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not include Homo sapiens as a species? If we try to imagine this, then we will
be able to evaluate, i.e., value properly, the status (ontological, ecological, 
ethical) of “the animals” that live or die at the limits with “the human”—this
human who, as self-determining “sovereign” in relation to “the beast,” deter-
mines these limits first conceptually (either through force or the law) and then
in the actual encounter with “the animal.”
Thus, let us begin by listening, by attuning ourselves, to Derrida’s indictment,
stated thus:
No one can deny seriously any more, or for very long, that men do all they
can in order to dissimulate this cruelty [towards animals], or to hide it from
themselves; in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misun-
derstanding of this violence, which some would compare to the worst cases
of genocide (there are also animal genocides: the number of species endan-
gered because of man takes one’s breath away). One should neither abuse
the figure of genocide nor too quickly consider it explained away. It gets
more complicated: the annihilation of certain species is indeed in process,
but it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of an artificial,
infernal, virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous gen-
erations would have judged monstrous, outside of every presumed norm of
a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their con-
tinued existence or even their overpopulation. As if, for example, instead
of throwing a people into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors
and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgen-
eration of Jews, gypsies and homosexuals by means of artificial insemi-
nation, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, they could
be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the
imposition of genetic experimentation, or extermination by gas or by fire.
In the same abattoirs. I don’t wish to abuse the ease with which one can
overload with pathos the self-evidences I am drawing attention to here.
Everybody knows what terrifying and intolerable pictures a realist paint-
ing could give to the industrial, mechanical, chemical, hormonal and genet-
ic violence to which man has been submitting animal life for the past two
centuries. Everybody knows what the production, breeding, transport and
slaughter of these animals has become. Instead of thrusting these images
in your faces or awakening them in your memory, something that would be
both too easy and endless, let me simply say a word about this “pathos.”
If these images are “pathetic,” if they evoke sympathy, it is also because
they “pathetically” open the immense question of pathos and the patho-
logical, precisely, that is, of suffering, pity and compassion; and the place
that has to be accorded to the interpretation of this compassion, to the shar-
ing of this suffering among the living, to the law, ethics and politics that
must be brought to bear upon this experience of compassion. What has
been happening for two centuries now involves a new experience of this
compassion. In response to what is, for the moment, the irresistible but
unacknowledged unleashing and the organized disavowal of this torture,
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voices are raised—minority, weak, marginal voices, little assured of their
right to discourse and of the enactment of their discourse within the law,
as a declaration of rights—in order to protest, in order to appeal […] to
what is still presented in such a problematic way as animal rights, in order
to awaken us to our responsibilities and our obligations. (Derrida, 2008, 
pp. 25–26, italics added)
Presumably, when interpreting Derrida according to his own principle for under-
standing philosophers (in epigraph above), he can be seen to draw attention to
the fact that he has failed to demonstrate the limit of the human and the animal.
Consistent with his deconstructive interrogation, Derrida defers the demonstra-
tion (i.e., “demonstration” in his sense of discursive reasoning of “the moral” to
be gained) (2009, p. 34). We emphasize the word “demonstrate” to intensify our
focus within Derrida’s lengthy remarks on this limit. Derrida issues a call to us
to articulate various implications and to follow his thought. Unavoidably, this
involves some preliminary comment, en passant, on a tradition of philosophical
thought, with its heavily invested taxonomy that is thereby also an economy of
order, and which Derrida engages as part of his interrogation of this limit. To
speak of a tradition here is to speak of a long-honoured authority, i.e., the author-
ity that belongs to tradition. It is a tradition that has been determinative of the
limit(s) of human and animal. But, for Derrida (as with others, no doubt) this
time-honoured authority is in question, given contemporary recognition of the
conceptual and actual violence, i.e., the geno-cide, being done to “the animal,”
to animals, and, indeed, thereby also to humans in their multifarious arrogations
of right and force.
AUTHORITY/POWER OF A TRADITION
Long ago, Aristotle denominated the human being as a zoon logon echon, i.e., a
living being capable of speech, one living being among other living beings. But,
even then, man—ho anthropos—was said to be the only living being having
speech in the sense of discourse (logos). As is well known among Western
philosophers, in the transition to the Latin renderings of this Greek concept,
philosophers of the medieval and scholastic era denominated the human as ani-
mal rationale, i.e., rational animal. With this rendering, the human being is
understood to be the only such being within human experience (excluding the-
ological claims that allow for divine beings or other supranatural beings such as
angels, demons or extraterrestrials).
These are, of course, metaphysical interpretations, dependent on one or another
epistemological clarification of a concept of rationality. The human is categorized
as an animal (one having animus, a principle or source of physical/physiological
motion as well as a principle of action in the sense of a free-will act). But, the
human is nonetheless distinguished from all animals by the stipulated essential
difference of rationality, i.e., the ability to reason, the capacity for cognition that
is part and parcel of human consciousness. Rationality is said to be essential to the
human way to be, which implies that rationality is not a mere accident in the sense
of a contingent trait that may or may not characterize a human being.
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In the modern philosophical period, with the advent of Descartes, we have the
human identified as res cogitans, i.e., as a thinking thing. As the essence of the
human, the ego or the I that thinks (i.e., the ego of Ego cogito ergo sum—I think
therefore I am) is entirely distinct from the body, from corporeality. Thus, for
Descartes res cogitans has no reference to animality, to the body as extended
thing (res extensae) as such. However, accounting for Descartes’ remarks in the
Meditations, Derrida noted that Descartes preferred not to “disentangle” the
“subtleties” involved in clarifying the concepts of animality and rationality, even
as Descartes’ thought intensified the modern epistemological and ontological
efforts to clarify the relation of mind and body, thus of consciousness to the
structure and function of the brain. After all, “Modern science suggests that there
is no manifestation of the human personality that is not produced through the
brain even though the brain may not be the effective cause” (Anderson, 2004,
p. 82).
In the late modern period, the philosopher Nietzsche sought to overturn the tra-
ditional conceptual framework of metaphysics, noting that the relation of ani-
mality and rationality remains “as yet undetermined.” But, if so, then the
question remains how we are to conceive anew the being that we presumably
mean when we say “human being” and when we distinguish it from that which
is animal as such, so as to speak with authority of the human way to be, but also
to speak with authority of the animal way to be—assuming these general cate-
gories mean something without being expressions of mere dogma.
Heidegger, a twentieth century existential phenomenologist, emphasized Niet-
zsche’s insight, turned away from metaphysical interpretations of the human
way to be, and rejected the primacy of consciousness (Bewusstsein) as such for
identifying the essential structures of human existence. Heidegger remained con-
cerned with the governing technological framework of contemporary thinking.
Calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken) that is prominent in the sciences
orders the whole of reality according to the conscription (die Gestellung), req-
uisitioning (Be-stellen) and positioning (das Stellen) of things into “standing
reserve” (der Bestand)—even humans themselves “already ordered into this req-
uisitioning,” in which case one cannot say that this is merely a matter of “human
machination with the character of exploitation” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 28). If ani-
mals, then, are conscripted, positioned, requisitioned and inventoried into a stand-
ing reserve as part of the ordering that characterizes industrial production, it is
because humans are themselves already ordered by this pervasive and invasive
calculative thinking that moves the industry of requisitioning. Through this think-
ing, the requisitioning of nature disposes both humans and animals to the vio-
lence of a positioning, that itself transforms into a dis-position, thus to the
dis-posing characteristic of the mass slaughter that befalls both humans and ani-
mals in genocide and geno-cide.
Heidegger comments on the immeasurable suffering that “creeps and rages over
the earth” consequent to calculative thinking. But, even Heidegger retained a
commitment to the concept of an essence of animality that set off, distinguished,
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the human being from all animals as a matter of ontological priority. Heidegger
granted humans their existence in a world that is a world only through their for-
mation of it (der Mensch ist weltbildend), but restricted animals to a captivation
(Benommenheit) by and absorption (Eingenommenheit) in their environment, a
world contrasted to environment such that all animals are declared “poor in
world” (das Tier ist weltarm) (1995).
In contrast, yet not wholly in contrast, to the metaphysical denominations of phi-
losophy, as a matter of empirical science the human is distinguished as a species
within a genus. The science of evolutionary biology installs for human under-
standing a taxonomy according to which the human is designated Homo sapiens,
and thereby declared to be one hominin among others within the family Homini-
nae, while the genus Homo is distinguished from the genus Pan (chimpanzee) and
Gorilla, with the human species-differentia designated as “sapiens.” Taxonomi-
cally, the emphasis is on morphology, i.e., similarity of physical forms and artic-
ulated bodily structures. However, the paleoanthropologist Lee Berger posits that:
Modern-day genetic research is providing evidence that morphological
distinctions are not necessarily proof of evolutionary relatedness. Recent
evidence suggests that humans are in fact more closely related to the chim-
panzee and bonobo than either species is to the gorilla. Chimps and
humans share something like 98 percent of genes, indicating that we share
a common ape ancestor. (Berger, 2010) 
Here we have the assertions of empirical science, all of which count as descrip-
tions only, not to be confused with the sort of evidence that would contribute to
prescriptions of human or other “nonhuman animal” moral status. The taxono-
my in place today continues to shift with ongoing analyses of biological and
paleoanthropological evidence. The taxonomical concept, “sapiens,” as a
species-differentia within the genus Homo does not in and of itself signify moral
status allowing to argue, on this supposed authority alone, that a member of the
genus-species Homo sapiens has a privileged moral standing relative to other
species within the genus or in relation to species of another genus. Indeed, the
empirical sciences have every reason to be instructed by Hume, the only empiri-
cist philosopher in the modern period, who asserted in 1739 that despite the
rationalism of his day, “no truth appears to me more evident than that beasts are
endow’d with thought and reason as well as men” (Hume, 1985, p. 226).
That said, however, we can also be instructed by Peter Singer when he says, “No
nonhuman animals, not even the other great apes, come close to matching our
capacity to reason” (Singer, 2006, p. 145). But here, in the setting of empirical sci-
ences such as primatology, we have the installation of what Donna Haraway has
rightly called a “construction of nature” and “a biopolitical divide.” The empha-
sis here is on an insistent yet ambiguous, unsettled division between the human
(uncaged primate) and the nonhuman (laboratory encaged primate) who can never
be (as a consequence of a stipulated taxon) anything more than mere “proto-
human” (Haraway, 1989; 2007). 
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DERRIDA’S INDICTMENT
Thus, given the indeterminacy associated with both philosophical and scientif-
ic declarations about the human, it behooves us to consider Derrida’s concern for
the limit between the human and the animal. Following remarks concerning the
animal from Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Derrida
stated: “My presence”—that is to say, the presence of the human being in his and
her “life-world” (Lebenswelt)—is there only to reveal what the thing would be
in my absence” (Derrida, 2008, p. 160; italics added). In other words, the point
here is to understand what it really means “to let be” a thing, in the present case
to let be a given animal, without the imposing, transposing or disposing gover-
nance that belongs to human design, including the research designs (protocols)
of biomedical practice. Derrida is concerned about all human designations of
the animal according to which the animal is “subject”—subjected to—and which
constitute a “dominion” that the human asserts to be his right or by force, thus
by whatever authority or power, be it philosophically or religiously grounded.
Among such assertions of dominion, Derrida cites Hobbes, who says that
humankind has the right over non-rational animals: 
That is, one may at discretion reduce to one’s service any animals that can
be tamed or made useful, and wage continual war against the rest as harm-
ful, and hunt them down and kill them. Thus, Dominion over animals has
its origin in the right of nature not in Divine positive right […] Since there-
fore it is by natural right [i.e., whatever ‘natural strength and powers’ are
mustered] that an animal kills a man, it will be by the same right that a
man slaughters an animal. (Hobbes, 1998, p. 108)
The foregoing discourse discloses a number of conceptual issues, all conse-
quences of a self-definition, a part of humanity’s autobiography, and essential-
ly uncontested “philosophemes” (units of knowledge that function to maintain
power). Derrida interrogated this in 1997 in a public lecture entitled “L’animal
que donc je suis” (The animal that therefore I am). And, indeed, speaking philo-
sophically, i.e., from the beginning of the Western tradition up through the twen-
tieth century, one can say that the human continues to construe himself as an
animal, albeit as more than mere animal. This self-definition, however, is such
that humans generally insist, as Derrida reminds, on an ambiguous and perhaps
even contradictory contrast, indeed on a rupture with “animals in general”; for,
the human insists above all that “the animal is deprived of language” (Derrida,
2008, p. 32). More to the point, the general singular term animal “applies to the
whole animal kingdom with the exception of the human.” All beings for whom
the taxonomical identification is located within the animal kingdom as a stipu-
lation of zoo-logy, bio-logy or physical anthropo-logy are, without question,
thereby deprived of language as such—deprived of the logos that is proper to
speech, to human discourse, because the power of logos is said to be proper only
to the human being among all living beings.
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Reviewing Descartes’ Meditations, Derrida makes a distinction between “the
law of nature,” which in the animal entails mere reaction to environmental stim-
uli, and “the law of freedom,” which in the human entails response and respon-
sibility (p. 83). In other words, an animal is capable naturally of reaction to
causally stimulating events, whereas the human is ever capable of response to
phenomena that engage his faculties of consciousness and sensibility in any pos-
sible experience. Response is a manifestation of human judgment, a cognitive
capacity that issues from the deliberative freedom of the human will. “The Carte-
sian animal,” writes Derrida, “would [by contrast with the human] remain inca-
pable of responding to true questioning. For it lacks the power of real questions”
(p. 84). Thus, the “limit to the response,” is for Descartes “the limit of the ani-
mal.” More accurately, one must say that the limit to the response is at best, for
Descartes, the limit of the given animal, although Derrida questions this, given
the multiplicity of differential structures that multiply the limits for the human–
animal relation.
For Derrida, however, it behooves us to go beyond the modern metaphysical
interpretations: 
[…] it is not just a matter of giving back to the animal whatever it has been
refused [heretofore] […] It is also a matter of questioning oneself con-
cerning the axiom that permits one to accord purely and simply to the
humans or to the rational animal that which one holds the just plain ani-
mal to be deprived of. (p. 95) 
Derrida sets himself the task of deconstructing the metaphysical interpretations
according to which the human being is denominated a rational animal, all the
while aware of developments within contemporary primatology2. This habitual
discourse is to be interrogated anew and the reigning axiom to be challenged.
Derrida reminds us of the discourse according to which:
The animal is not a rational being, since it is deprived of the “I think” that
is the condition for understanding and reason. In that way, deprived for the
same reason of liberty and autonomy, it cannot become the subject of rights
or duties, given the correlation between right and obligation that is prop-
er to the subject as a free person. (p. 99)
Derrida’s indictment of this discourse is perhaps most forceful when he says, “I
think that Cartesianism belongs […] to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition of
a war against the animal, of a sacrificial war that is as old as Genesis […] No eth-
ical or sentimental nobility must be allowed to conceal from us that violence
[…]” (p. 101). Indeed, taking Kant’s doctrine of practical reason into account,
Derrida adds further: 
One could say, first, that in the end such a bellicose hatred in the name of
human rights, far from rescuing man from the animality that he claims to
rise above, confirms the waging of a kind of species war and confirms that
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the man of practical reason remains bestial in his defensive and repressive
aggressivity, in his exploiting the animal to death. (p. 101; italics added). 
It is here, in this exploitation of the animal to death, that the human—who is
himself bestial—is charged with geno-cide, with torture, with the simultane-
ously repressive and aggressive death of the animal as such, all part of a dog-
matically asserted sovereignty of the human over the beast in the whole scheme
of nature. But, then, if the human is himself bestial, then we have before us the
sovereignty of the sovereign beast over all other beasts—as it were, the “first
animal” among animals, thus l’animal que donc je suis.
The foregoing discloses Derrida’s reference to a religious conception of the
human being, which is at base consistent with that of the Greek, scholastic and
modern European philosophical tradition. The consistency is in part a conse-
quence of the attempted syntheses of the Greek attention to ontology (study of
beings) and the Judaic, Christian and Islamic attention to theology (study of
divine being), thus to the philosophical development of an onto-theo-logical dis-
course that contributes to the dominion of the human over all animals3 . Com-
menting on Adam’s relation to the animals, Derrida reminds us that God “created
man in his likeness so that man will subject, tame, dominate, train, or domesti-
cate the animals born before him and assert his authority over them” (p. 16).
The divine creative act is thus purposive, teleo-logical: “God destines the animals
to an experience of the power of man, in order to see the power of man in action,
in order to see the power of man at work, in order to see man take power over all
the other living beings” (p. 16).
For those who accept the authority of the biblical religious tradition, this power
of man is unproblematic, given the authority of God (Elohim, YHWH) to com-
mand Adam. However, Derrida reads Genesis as “an awful tale,” in the sense of
inspiring awe, surely, but also in the sense of recognition of harm (p. 18). It is
“aweful” precisely to the degree that man becomes “master of nature and of the
animal,” the human claiming “superiority over what is called animal life,” this
superiority being both “infinite and par excellence” such that man’s superiority
is “at one and the same time unconditional and sacrificial” (p. 20). Such,
observes Derrida, “would be the law of an imperturbable logic, both Promethean
and Adamic, both Greek and Abrahamic (Judaic, Christian, and Islamic).” So
imperturbable is this logic, says Derrida, that “Its variance hasn’t stopped being
verified all the way to our modernity” (p. 21).
But, one can say the tale of Genesis is “awful” in another sense; and here one
must review the religious account. Derrida distinguishes the relation of Adam to
animals, as described in “the two accounts of Genesis”:
before the fall [of Adam and Eve] and the institution of nakedness [i.e.,
Adam’s and Eve’s awareness of their nakedness, which is the origin of
their awareness of the difference of good and evil and, thereby, of their
contravention of the divine imperative], God clearly commanded Adam to
10
2
V
O
L
U
M
E
 
8
 
N
U
M
É
R
O
 
1
 
 
 
 
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
3
feed himself as a gatherer and not as a hunter. He has to eat what grows
on the surface of the earth and on trees [Gen. 1:29]. It is later, after the
fall, that Abel will have himself preferred by God by offering up to him the
sacrifices of a sedentary cultivator. Finally, Cain had been more faithful to
God’s arch-primary commandment, and the whole history, that is to say,
the fault and criminality that install historicality, is linked to God’s pref-
erence for Abel’s animal offering […].” (pp. 112–113; italics added)
In short, Derrida says pointedly, “Abel is also he who dominates and raises ani-
mals, then makes a sacrifice of them to God.” (p. 113) It is thus with Abel and
not with Cain that the animal becomes sacrificial and, as sacrifice, the utmost
manifestation of human sovereignty, of man’s dominion, over all animal life. In
the garden of Eden both Adam and Eve eat from the bounty of its trees, both
man and woman herbivorous. After the fall from grace through sin, the human
becomes carnivorous, the animal’s skin or “hide” having become first the means
to cover, to hide, human nakedness, the hide of the human’s otherwise manifest
shame. Henceforth, the animal serves as the means to God’s dispensation of for-
giveness for the human: The animal thus becomes sacrificial as the sufficient
compensatory justice for all human transgressions of the divine imperatives.
We must ask ourselves, therefore, what word the religious, ancient Hebrew tra-
dition uses for “animal” when Adam is invited to call the animals before him so
as to name them. The word (e.g., Genesis 1:21) is nephesh, often translated as
“living creature,” thus the animal associated first and foremost with life, and
only thereafter specified as “soul” and related (with some error in concept) to the
philosophical concept of “mind.” The man, ha adam, is created in the image
(tzelem) of God (a confounding idea even yet) and given dominion (Gen. 1:28)
over all animals that are brought forth “after their kind.” The idea of Adam and
Eve created in God’s image lends reason, according to biblical anthropology, to
the distinction of human and animal as one in which only the human relates to
the divine, and that this relation to the divine is possible through the human’s
proper capacity of spirit (ruach) in addition to life, to nephesh, that the animal
is said to lack (Anderson, 2004).
Derrida is clear about the relation of the human to the animal as stipulated in the
religious context of the limit: “[…] the beast ignorant of right and the sovereign
having the right to suspend right, to place himself above the law that he is, that
he makes, that he institutes, as to which he decides, sovereignly” (Derrida, 2009,
p. 32). Thus, it makes sense to speak of human right(s), even if only as a self-
assignment and self-appropriation. Such right(s) are the stipulation of the human
in his sovereign power to command, thereby to dispose of the animal according
to human interest. The human as sovereign may manifest his “zoophilia,” e.g.,
at best, in his domestication of the animal that “lives with” the human as house-
hold pet (Haraway, 2008). But, generally, the human interest prevails over all
animal interests, such that zoo-philia is displaced by a reigning zoo-polemos in
word and deed that conceptually enframes, then encages, the animal as research
subject.
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One may declare the foregoing to be a political-philosophical assessment. But,
the story or, if one will, the “fable,” of Genesis can also have a moral lesson that
ostensibly instructs the human as to both his rightful sovereignty and his right-
ful subjection of the animal. Here we have the moral question of the limit(s) that
Derrida does not demonstrate but which must be taken up in following his inter-
rogation. Of central significance here is the credence one is to give to the fable
that tells a moral lesson. In this regard, Derrida says “in the prevalent or hege-
monic tradition of the political, a political discourse, and above all a political
action, should in no case come under the category of the fabular […]”—for the
fable, which cannot but be both “aweful” and “awful,” is such that the fabular
gives “the impression of knowing […] the effect of knowledge, resembling
knowing where there isn’t necessarily any knowing […] [i.e.,] the knowing is a
pretend knowing, a false knowing, a simulacrum of knowing […]” (Derrida,
2009, pp. 34–35).
Thus, where the fabular is merely phenomenally (i.e., dissembling) a knowing,
that which is given as known is in point of fact not known. This raises unavoid-
ably and even necessarily, as a matter of responsibility, the question as to the
justification, the justice, of any political decision, any political action that is
issued on the basis of the fabular—including any bio-political decisions and
actions affecting historically delimited and ongoing commitments to the sup-
posed limit(s) of the human and the nonhuman animal. Those deaths and suf-
fering that are hardly fabular but quite real in the industrial slaughter of animals
and animal biomedical experimentation, which “are yet carried off and inscribed
in the affabulatory score,” elicit our interrogation, even a revision, of our con-
cepts of justice (p. 36).
DERRIDEAN BIOETHICS?
In July 2010, the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) in
the United States issued a position paper on animal research. Taking into account
the U.S. Animal Welfare Act regulations, PCRM proposed not only “the explo-
ration of methods that replace animal use,” but also insisted on a regulatory man-
date for replacement of animals in research (PCRM, 2010). The American
Psychological Association similarly cautions researchers, albeit with reference
to a utilitarian conceptual framework that is consistent with the usual regulato-
ry oversight expected from Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees
(IACUC)4.
In a discussion on the ethics of animal research in the context of scientific prac-
tice in the United Kingdom, and accounting for the Animals (Scientific Proce-
dures) Act of 1986, Festing and Wilkinson opined, “No responsible scientist
wants to use animals or cause them unnecessary suffering if it can be avoided,
and therefore scientists accept controls on the use of animals in research” (Fes-
ting and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 1). But, here too, the focus is on cost-benefit analy-
sis, “benefit” here meaning “research for the benefit of human health,” with
reduction and refinement in the use of animals preferred over replacement. Thus,
the governing strategy is rank-ordered—(1) reduction in use, (2) refinement of
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methods of use, and (3) replacement of animal experimentation with other
research methods. This is consistent with the final report of a working group of
the Laboratory Animal Science Association (LASA) and the Animal Procedures
Committee in the United Kingdom, which argued that “[t]he introduction of a
process for retrospective reporting of the severity of scientific procedures on
animals would be beneficial in terms of enhanced openness and public account-
ability, and could also bring animal welfare and scientific benefits.” The report
further states that it is problematic that protocols up to now are not “designed for
reporting actual severity” but, instead, provide only “predictions of potential
adverse effects,” in which case there is no actual reporting of “degree of pain,
suffering, distress or lasting harm actually experienced by animals involved in
the projects” (LASA, 2008, pp. i–2).
In its engagement of such issues, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics states on its
website that “the proper moral treatment of a being depends on the characteris-
tics it possesses, rather than simply on the species to which it belongs,” the rel-
evant features including: 
Sentience (the capacity to feel pleasure and pain); Higher cognitive capac-
ities (for example, the ability to use language and learn complicated tasks,
such as making and using tools); The capacity to flourish (the ability to sat-
isfy species-specific needs); Sociability (being a member of a communi-
ty); Possession of a life (attributing value to life itself)5. 
At issue here is whether these traits present absolute constraints or are relative
to the weight they have, given some utilitarian estimate of human benefit that
overrules objection to the use of animals for biomedical research.
However, these position statements beg the following questions: What does it
mean to be a responsible scientist when the scientist designs a research investi-
gation involving the use of animals? To whom—or to what—is the scientist
responsible when proposing or otherwise conducting research on nonhuman ani-
mals? What are the conditions under which animal suffering is necessary
because, so it is said, “it cannot be avoided”? Problematic in any claim that ani-
mal suffering is necessary is the fact that there is little scientific data available
to warrant this claim. Usually, human suffering “refers to the subjective experi-
ence of unpleasant emotions such as fear, pain and frustration that are private and
known only to the person experiencing them” (Dawkins, 2008, p. 1). As a work-
ing definition of “suffering,” the working group of the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics proposed the following: “A negative emotional state which derives
from adverse physical, physiological and psychological circumstances, in accor-
dance with the cognitive capacity of the species and of the individual being, and
its life’s experience” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005, p. 62). The British
Society of Animal Science addresses the issue of animal pain, stating that “The
‘cost’ to animals can be defined as any harm in the form of pain, distress or
other forms of suffering that an animal experiences at any stage of its life as a
consequence of the research6”. Aside from assumption and belief, then, the sci-
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entific question is (a) whether nonhuman animals have such subjective experi-
ences, and (b) how this is to be known by a scientist involved in animal experi-
mentation.
Consider that bioethicist Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri have proposed grant-
ing human rights to nonhuman great apes, thereby blurring a limit between the
human and the animal, in this case certain primates. Singer and Cavalieri go so
far as to privilege nonhuman primates over dysfunctional, handicapped (e.g., the
mentally ill) humans in the allocation of rights. One notes here that the propos-
al is such that these rights are construed as human rights and not as animal rights
per se (Cavalieri, 2003; Cavalieri and Singer, 1993). Singer and Cavalieri base
this proposal on a scientific claim that these primates have the cognitive capac-
ity to learn language. The point here is not lost on Derrida, who, confronting
this “humanist logic,” argues that:
To put this limit to the test of the worst experimentations, it is enough (I
leave it to you) to imagine a thousand situations in which one would have
to decide which life goes first—before the other […] [Saving] a human
embryo a few weeks old, destined after birth to live a short life—one day,
for example—and a life of mental and physical handicap—saving such a
life without the slightest future ought to come before the lives of millions,
or an infinite number of living animals in full health and with a full future.
Who will say that this choice really is possible or easy? […] what is cer-
tain is that in the humanist logic […] the putting to death of the newborn,
abandoning the newborn to its death, the failure to assist a person in dan-
ger that that represents, will be judged to be criminal and cruel, whereas
the killing of billions of beasts would not be. (Derrida, 2009, pp. 109–110;
italics added)
By contrast to a proposal such as that of Singer and Cavalieri, Derrida is less con-
cerned with the question whether animals have language and more with the ques-
tion of their suffering. Following Jeremy Bentham, Derrida asks: Can they
suffer? This is a problematic question for Derrida inasmuch as it brings to the
fore the moral demand to interrogate the human capacity for compassion, i.e., the
sharing of suffering among living beings, assuming the so-called responsible
scientist can share in the suffering of the animal that, though a living being, is a
subject of the animal research process stipulated in the scientist’s research
design, the protocol that authorizes the research. To share in the suffering of the
animal is to manifest compassion such as humans are declared to possess; and
this raises the additional question about the limit(s) that belong to human com-
passion7.
To ask whether animals can suffer seems naive, given that the IACUC review
presupposes that animals do suffer and that such suffering should be minimized
during all processes that are part of the use of animals in biomedical research.
But, Derrida asserts a mandate, unequivocally: “The relations between humans
and animals must change. They must, both in the sense of an ‘ontological’ neces-
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sity and of an ‘ethical’ duty” (2004, p. 70). Ontology, of course, concerns the way
one construes the being of the given animal as one being, in this case a living
being, among other beings. To speak of ethical duty here is to intend a redeter-
mination of the ethics of animal experimentation; and to speak of duty here is to
intend a non-utilitarian discourse. It will not do merely to transpose the concept
of human rights to animals, even if limited (as proposed by Singer and Cava-
lieri) to some species of nonhuman primates. For, when one does so one mere-
ly presupposes, tacitly and without warrant, the priority of the human as the focal
point on the basis of which an analysis may proceed. Indeed, Derrida “regard[s]
it as ridiculous and heinous to place certain animals above handicapped humans
in some new hierarchy” (p. 73). 
Derrida is clear why this is untenable: “A certain concept of the human subject,
of post-Cartesian human subjectivity, is for the moment at the foundation of the
concept of human rights,” which is wholly problematic insofar as “this Cartesian
legacy determines all of modernity, including the human relation to ‘the animal”
(pp. 70-71). Thus, Derrida cautions against a violence that has its origin in con-
cept, arguing that “to confer or to recognize rights for ‘animals’ is a surrepti-
tious or implicit way of confirming a certain interpretation of the human subject,
which itself will have been the very lever of the worst violence carried out against
nonhuman living beings” (p. 71). The ethical duty one has toward animals, if
this is to be clarified correctly, requires that one interrogate—and ultimately
reject—this surreptitious interpretation of the human, and do so as a matter of
ontological necessity.
The clarification of the former is impossible without the clarification of the lat-
ter. To Derrida, a proposal such as that of Singer and Cavalieri is unacceptable;
he maintains that: 
To want absolutely to grant, not to animals but to a certain category of ani-
mals, rights equivalent to human rights would be a disastrous contradiction.
It would reproduce the philosophical and juridical machine thanks to which
the exploitation of animal material for food, work, experimentation, etc., has
been practiced (and tyrannically so, that is, through an abuse of power. (p. 71).
Thus, the distinction between use and abuse/misuse of animals is blurred in ani-
mal experimentation, to the point of either ignoring or denying from the outset,
without a prior interrogation of the question, that such use is misuse and abuse of
human power, i.e., a show of human force in contrast to the exercise of human
right that is not mere dogma. One has to ask whether and how animal experimen-
tation is itself an instance of what Derrida calls “the ‘techno-scientific’ patholo-
gies of the market or of industrial production,” (p. 71) which includes animal
research linked to the R&D component of industrial production of biomedical
technologies and biomedical techno-scientific pathologies for numerous animal
species. One must ask this even while conceding that, as Derrida opines, oblique-
ly, inviting our further interrogation of the claim: “No doubt it will always be nec-
essary to kill animals” (p. 75).
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Awareness of animal suffering is, for Derrida, to be gained not in the setting of
an isolated animal killing but in the setting of industrial slaughter. Hence, the
scale, itself a consequence of technological enframing of animal existence, is
central to the assessment. We have here what Derrida calls an intolerable spec-
tacle, hence his question: “If you were actually placed every day before the spec-
tacle of this industrial slaughter, what would you do?” (p. 76). This is not an idle
question. It poses the problem of every individual human’s ethical duty in the
face of what should be intolerable, every day. Derrida is clear: 
I’m saying that we must not invoke the violence among animals, in the
jungle or elsewhere, as a pretext for giving ourselves over to the worst
kinds of violence, that is, the purely instrumental, industrial, chemico-
genetic treatment of living beings. Whether this treatment is carried out
for the production of food or in the form of experimentation, it is neces-
sary to set up rules so that one cannot do just whatever one pleases with
nonhuman living beings. (p. 78)
This means questioning why a procedure is acceptably instrumental; why the
scale must be industrial; why the protocol must be chemico-genetic; etc. How-
ever, and this is a steep barrier to surmount: These must be rules that are equiv-
alent in force and in law [droit] to rules against genocide: “[G]athering together
hundreds of thousands of beasts every day, sending them to the slaughterhouse,
and killing them en masse after having fattened them with hormones” (p. 78)—
this, for Derrida, is a spectacle for which the concept “genocide” (geno-cide,
elimination of genus after genus, species-group after species-group, up to the
millions in number, daily) applies.
But, allowing for this appropriation of concept, one has to ask: Does genocide
apply in the case of biomedical research, in which animals are used/mis-
used/abused? One can surely experience a use of an animal that is a misuse, even
a use of an animal that is abuse, hence the regulatory restrictions on research
methods that accept animal suffering. But, neither misuse nor abuse of an ani-
mal necessarily amounts to genocide, in the sense stated by Derrida. Of course,
Derrida is prepared to surrender the word, but if and only if one is well aware of
what he is talking about so as not to dismiss—prematurely and without interro-
gation—any claim that, ethically speaking, such use/misuse/abuse is tolerable
(Derrida, 2004). So, one may suspend judgment, for the moment, as to whether
animal experimentation in general, when sanctioned institutionally (e.g., through
IACUC review of research protocols), amounts to genocide. Derrida provides a
provisional, somewhat broad guideline: 
The difficulty of ethical responsibility is that the response cannot be for-
mulated as a “yes or no” […] It is necessary to give a singular response,
within a given context, and to take the risk of a decision by enduring the
undecidable. In every case, there are two contradictory imperatives. (p. 81);
italics added). 
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The institutional review (industry, academia, research centre) of research proto-
col works with specific cases of animal research, no doubt. But, the task here is
to reconsider whether the risk to animals is not exceeded by a decision of an
IACUC in the event its members are not prepared to endure the undecidable and
sustain the case as undecidable rather than approve given protocols. In short,
Derrida is moving the regulatory decision not in the direction of approval, but
instead in the direction of a declaration that the matter is undecidable, and there-
fore not permissible, whatever the instrumental value presupposed.
This is not to say that the undecidable is endured on the ground of a declaration
of right. If the concept of right in the context of human rights is a matter for
deconstruction, it is also a concept that must be rethought, says Derrida. The
point here is not to set forth a declaration of animal rights but, instead, “to recon-
sider the history of law and of the concept of right” such that we can then speak
with more clarity of how “right” applies to the animal, to animals, including the
animal that is used/misued/abused in the institutional setting of biomedical
research (pp. 78-79). Two examples suffice to point out what Derrida means to
demonstrate here.
Consider a case of biomedical research involving an animal (thus, a singular
case) that opens up the ethical review to contradictory imperatives and poses for
reviewers the prospect of enduring the undecidable. Kevin Eggan (Department
of Stem Cell and Regenerative Biology and the Harvard Stem Cell Institute) pur-
sues research on amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), the construction and
deconstruction of stem cell models of degenerative neurological disease, and
cell reprogramming (Han, et al., 2005; Egli, et al., 2009; Eggan, 2008). In 2004,
Eggan presented a research proposal to Harvard’s ethical review boards “to use
stem cells extracted from cloned human embryos to study the development of
diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s disease” (Kaplan, 2004). From
the perspective of regenerative human medicine, Eggan’s research is unprob-
lematic. He works with a mutated gene (SOD1=superoxide dismutase-1) that is
identified as a cause of ALS in less than 20% of human ALS patients. Working
with mice as an in vivomodel to phenocopy the disease, mice stem cells are bred
“to have either the normal human SOD gene or the mutated version, then allowed
[…] to differentiate into motor neurons in large numbers […] [Both] the normal
and the mutated motor neurons [show] signs of neurodegeneration when cul-
tured with SOD-mutant support cells” (Dana Foundation, 2008). 
This kind of research involves “breeding and maintaining SOD1 mutant mouse
colonies” (Leitner, et al., 2009, p. 1). There is commercial breeding, thus an
“industrial production,” of these transgenic mutant mice (“transgenic,” “mutant”
and “mice” already signals the need for interrogation) as well as individual
research laboratory breeding and management of colonies of such “mice.” Some
strains are inbred (e.g., 20 generations of brother-sister mating), yielding the
research scientist’s desired genotype, consistent with the protocol. Other strains
are congenic through targeted mutations and transfer of transgenes (e.g., back-
crossed for 10 or more generations). Some mouse models are hybrid, e.g.,
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“breeding transgenic males back to a wildtype […] female,” (Leitner, et. al.,
2009), thus assuring replacement of the genome. All such genotypically-altered
“animals” are considered “stock” for research, and thus made available from
facilities such as The Jackson Laboratory (located in Bar Harbor, Maine/USA).
“Transgenic mutant SOD1 mice are the only ALS mouse models currently avail-
able that exhibit all of the histopathological hallmarks observed clinically in spo-
radic and familiar ALS” (Leitner, 2009, here and for the remaining in-text
citations in this paragraph, pp. 1-6). Experimentation in this way means high
degenerative morbidity in such “mice”—“In all of these mouse models, mas-
sive death of motor neurons in the ventral horn of the spinal cord and loss of
myelinated axons in ventral motor roots ultimately leads to paralysis and mus-
cle atrophy,” with disease progression varying from “slow” (4–6 weeks) to “fast”
(7–10 days). In addition to mortality due to progression of the disease, deaths
also occur due to infection, “damage incurred in the process of delivering the
therapeutic intervention of interest,” or because of “other non-disease-related”
causes. Further, “SOD1 mouse models of disease, especially on congenic back-
grounds, appear to be quite sensitive to environmental factors”; i.e., “there is
evidence to suggest that SOD1 mutant mice may be more susceptible to these
potential stressors than wildtype animals.” For example, a given researcher may
subject these mutants to “intense, high endurance exercise regimes,” which “have
been shown to exacerbate motor defects and shorten life-span.” Further, “both
stressful and enriched housing conditions [e.g., stressors such as excessive han-
dling, crowded cages, presence/absence of nesting material, noisy environments,
erratic changes in light/dark cycle, etc.] can cause physiological and behavioral
consequences to laboratory mice […] and may impact the measured survival of
SOD1 mutant transgenic mice.”
Clearly, this is a research model in which “an animal”—the transgenic mutant
mouse—that has been genetically altered from its wildtype suffers from the onset
through to death of neurological deficits, including: “collapse or partial collapse
of leg extension towards lateral midline (weakness) or trembling of hind legs
during tail suspension”; “toes curl under at least twice during walking of 12 inch-
es, or any part of foot is dragging along cage bottom/table”; “rigid paralysis or
minimal joint movement, foot not being used for forward motion”; and finally,
the “mouse cannot right itself within 30 seconds from either side.” This suffer-
ing is both foreseen and intended as part of the scientist’s research protocol.
Some researchers expect therapeutic delivery is required at disease onset, while
others argue for pre-onset delivery, whatever the observations of neurological
score and, thus, observed suffering. In preclinical studies using this transgenic
mutant model, “death […] is typically measured as the inability of an animal to
right itself within 15–30 seconds if laid on either side,” entailing “euthaniza-
tion” (because “the animal is no longer capable of reaching the food hopper or
water source”) (p. 5).
As a matter of humane use of these mutants relative to the goal of therapeutic
efficacy, it is recommended that, before a researcher undertakes thorough pre-
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clinical studies in large cohorts of these models, s/he should “ensure that the
therapeutic intervention of interest has the intended effect on the target tissue of
interest [e.g., brain tissue, spinal cord tissue] using a reasonable biological cor-
relate” (p. 6). Such “target tissue confirmation studies” count as “proof-of-con-
cept studies” and allow for reduction in the number of animal models to be used
in the preclinical study—the difference between the concepts “animal” and “ani-
mal model” being that the former refers to the natural being and the latter to the
enframed being. Thus, “a preclinical study is not warranted if the treatment of
interest is unable to reproduce in vivo the biological effect predicted or shown in
vitro” (p. 6).
The foregoing is but one example of animal experimentation in which one can
interrogate a “limit” between the human who uses/misuses/abuses otherwise
wildtype mice through breeding of inbred, congenic and hybrid mutants. But,
as the Nuffield Council working group remarks, genetic modification remains
a matter of concern, i.e., “concerns about the unpredictable consequences that the
deletion or addition of one or a combination of genes may have on animals that
have been modified” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005, p. 80). After blas-
tocyst implantation in a surrogate, “chimera with reproductive cell modifica-
tion” leads to inbreeding, i.e., transgenic offspring (p. 98). “The welfare
implications for animals used in these kinds of experiments cannot be predict-
ed because it is not known beforehand what type of defect may be produced by
the genetic modification,” although there are usually “severe development
effects” (p. 99). Further, it is well known that reproductive cloning techniques are
designed “to facilitate the targeted genetic modification of animals,” (p. 100) a
clear violence that presents the problem of a simulacrum of scientific/biomed-
ical knowledge, i.e., what Derrida called the “fabula” that displaces real knowl-
edge. Movement in the direction of commodification is evident, given the claim
that: 
One of the aims of the international community of mouse geneticists is to
develop at least one mouse mutant line for every gene in the mouse
genome over the next 20 years. The total number of mice that are expect-
ed to be used in mutagenesis and phenotyping studies is of the order of
several million each year in the UK alone. (Nuffield Council, 2005, p. 122;
Abbott, 2004)
There is an even more troubling example that relates to Derrida’s concern for
limit(s) between human and animal. How are we to process news such as
“Researchers in California have created living mice with functioning human
stem cells in their brains,” as reported in National Geographic News in 2005?
(Handwerk, 2005). What does such research mean if it “raises the specter of ani-
mal-human hybrids,” even if in the case of this animal model “less than one-
tenth of one percent of the test mice’s brain cells are human”? (Handwerk, 2005)
Surely, such researchers consider themselves responsible scientists, because this
research “suggests that it will be possible to create mouse ‘models’ of human
brain tissue, enabling scientists to try out both stem cell interventions and other
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potential cures on living human brain cells without having to use humans in the
process.” (Handwerk, 2005) In this decision, the humanist logic that concerns
Derrida is nowhere interrogated, nor is it unlikely to be interrogated because of
its invisibility to most researchers and bioethicists, whose conceptual framework
of bioethics analysis tends to be thoroughly modern (i.e., utilitarian or deonto-
logical).
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has issued a series of voluntary research
guidelines that “proposed limits on the amount of animal ‘humanization’ that
should be permitted.” (Handwerk, 2005) (The very concept of “animal human-
ization” speaks volumes, pointing in the direction of the undecidable, as the ani-
mal as wildtype is contrasted to the animal model that is transgenic.) But,
notably, the Academy does not move in the direction of permanent restriction.
One bioethicist, Glenn McGee, opines that “[c]ritics of this research would have
you believe that to grow our cells in other creatures is repugnant and inhumane.
Mice already grow human ears and are used in many experiments to grow
colonies of other human cells.”  (Handwerk, 2005) One may argue these mix-
tures are modest indeed. But, what happens if/when, as examined by William
Saletan in his article “Making Manimals” in The Washington Post, a scientist
decides to “increase the ratio of human to animal DNA,” inserting human brain
cells “early in embryonic development,” thus to “shape the animals’ architec-
ture,” allowing embryos to grow to maturity, even implanting the resulting
embryos in a foster adult, so the embryo can develop, so as to then perform addi-
tional experiments on the human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) cultured from
this “transgenic animal” having whatever ratio of human to animal DNA (Sale-
tan, 2007)?
It is curious indeed when one asserts that such research is quite “logical,” i.e.,
“The more you humanize animals, the better they serve their purpose as lab mod-
els of humanity […] It’s the future of medicine” (Saletan, 2007). Such research
even moves onward to primates, to inserting “human neural stem cells in mon-
key brains,” with scientists hoping that such cells will integrate appropriately
into mouse or rat [or monkey] brain (Ourednik, 2001, p. 1822), This is not to
deny a fact of scientific research: “Embryonic cell mixing and recombination
experiments between related species are a traditional approach of experimental
embryology, used for more than a hundred years to understand embryonic
processes at the cellular level” (James, et al., 2006, p. 97). But, there is more
here to be considered than meets the eye, and which should draw the attention
of the Derridean deconstructive eye.
Transgenic animals are yet different from proposed chimeras, such as the embry-
onic mouse/human chimera created by researchers (following National Acade-
my of Sciences injection protocol and approved by the Rockefeller University
Bioethics Committee). In research conducted at Rockefeller University, scientists
worked “to insert human stem cells in mice before [the mice have constructed
their own brain architecture],” (Saletan, 2007), i.e., “embryonic day 3.5 mouse
blastocysts” having “10–15 cell clumps” that are “cultured in vitro for 6 days”
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(James, et al., 2006, p. 91). For now, there is a scientific limit in these experi-
ments: “Because in vitro culture of blastocyst outgrowths cannot begin to reca-
pitulate the dynamic process of early embryonic development in vivo, it is
unclear from these experiments whether hESCs and mouse ICM [intracellular
mass] derivatives would combine to form a coherent embryo” (p. 96). Further,
“Given the strikingly disparate developmental schedules for mouse and human
embryogenesis, it is unexpected that embryonic cell types from the two species
could be combined within chimeras to form a coherent embryo” (p. 97). How-
ever, James et. al. nonetheless argue that: 
Due to obvious barriers precluding the use of human embryos in […] cell
mixing experiments with hESCs, human/non-human chimeras may need
to be generated […] Embryonic chimeras generated in this way offer the
opportunity to study the behavior of specialized human cell types in a non-
human animal model. (p. 96)
Accordingly, James et. al. pursued their experiments to the next logical stage of
research design: 
To determine whether embryonic chimeras generated by blastocyst injec-
tion would give rise to developmentally viable embryos in vivo, we tran-
siently implanted hESC-injected blastocysts into the uterus of
pseudopregnant foster mice and harvested them, along with uninjected
controls, at embryonic day 8 […] Of 28 chimeric embryos that were
implanted, 24 formed deciduae that contained embryos […]. (p. 97) 
With this experiment, James et. al. have published data that “establish for the
first time that hESCs can integrate into the mouse embryo, validating the poten-
tial for non-human embryos to serve as a surrogate environment in which to
study hESCs and their derivatives” (p. 98).
Thus, following Derrida, one must ask, as a consequence of both ontological
necessity and ethical duty, what happens to the limit between the human and the
mouse when scientists report “Strikingly, hESCs that engrafted to mouse
embryos localized to their niche of origin, the ICM, despite a hundred million
years of evolutionary distance” (p. 91)? We must also ask ourselves what might
be said about this limit when scientists then propose: 
These approaches can be extended to take advantage of the large collec-
tion of mutant mice for use as host, and genetically modified and/or dis-
eased hESCs as graft, to address both basic embryological properties of
hESCs as well as to shed light on their potential application for cell-based
therapies. (p. 91) 
What happens to yet other limits when one learns from other experiments that
“chimeras generated from the more evolutionarily distant species were not
viable, presumably due to irreconcilable differences between developmental pro-
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grams”? (p. 100) Or, on the other hand, that “chimeras generated from mixing
embryos of closely related species […] resulted in successful development to
adulthood”? (p. 100)
Already, we have the evidence of completed experiments and publication of
research reporting grafting human neural stem cells into the brains of fetal mon-
keys (Ourednik, 2001). In addition, we have a postnatal chimera such as XO47,
“an average green vervet monkey,” (Shreeve, 2005), a research animal among
others at a biomedical research facility on the Caribbean island of St. Kitts. As
part of research conducted by Yale University’s psychiatrist and neurosurgeon
Eugene Redmond, XO47 has “three million human brain cells injected into his
cranium [the basal ganglia]” as part of in vivo research related to Parkinson’s dis-
ease (Schreeve, 2005). Would one consider a scientist responsible (in Derrida’s
sense) if s/he decides to mix embryos of more closely related species—say, cell
mixing of hESCs and chimpanzee blastocyst? Given the 98+% genomic simi-
larity of the two species, notwithstanding different number of chromosomes (46
for human, 48 for chimpanzee), there is hope of successful development result-
ing in a coherent embryo implanted in a pseudo-pregnant chimpanzee, that is
then permitted to develop to term for subsequent in vivo experimentation. After
all, it is argued, that such a viable chimeric humanzee,made possible by blurring
the current limit between a human (Homo sapiens) and a chimpanzee (Pan
troglodytes), could “be of considerable value for the modeling of human devel-
opment and disease in live animals,” and thus for scientific progress in human
neurogenesis. (Shreeve, 2005)
Yet, again following Derrida, is it not the case that “all modern genetic research,
including the sequencing of the human genome itself, underscores how trivial
biological difference really is between a human being and the rest of life”
(Schreeve, 2005)? Indeed, the Working Group on Interspecific Chimeric Brains
commented that: 
Many of us expected that, once we’d pooled our expertise, we’d be able to
say why human cells would not produce significant changes in non-human
brains. But the cell biologists and the neurologists couldn’t specify limits
on what implanted cells might do, and the primatologists explained that
gaps in our knowledge of normal non-human primate abilities make it dif-
ficult to detect changes. And there’s no philosophical consensus on the
moral significance of changes in abilities if we could detect them. (Greene,
2005) 
Perhaps it is to be said that biological difference as such, or in and of itself, can-
not be governing in any discourse concerning the ontological and moral status
of beings, human or nonhuman.
In 2005, one commentator wrote: 
In the future brave new world of neuroscience, surgeons hope to be able to
replace lost or diseased parts of the brain with new, healthy neural stem
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cells grown in the lab. Testing this therapy first in animals would show
how well the cells integrate themselves in the brain […] If stem cell ther-
apies for Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease were to be developed, regu-
latory authorities might specifically require tests in primates before going
further in permitting clinical trials with human patients. (“Testing,” 2005) 
Despite ongoing questions about whether primates generally provide good ani-
mal models for human neurodegenerative disease, Greene et al. consider
“whether experiments with stem cells and the brain” pose “any new, unique eth-
ical quandaries” (Greene, et al., 2005). This panel “unanimously rejected ethi-
cal objections grounded on unnaturalness or crossing species boundaries,” citing
empirical claims that “the notion that there are fixed species boundaries is not
well supported in science or philosophy” (Committee, 2005). Concurring with
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the panel sees “no new ethical or regu-
latory issues regarding chimeras themselves” (Greene, et. al., 2005). Such a
claim is defensible only by appeal to the humanist logic that is in contention.
That said, the panel does concede that “[o]ne conceivable result of H–NHP
[human–nonhuman primate] neural grafting is that the resulting creature will
develop humanlike cognitive capacities relevant to moral status.” (Greene, et.
al., 2005) Indeed, the panel concluded unanimously that it was “unable to rule
out the possibility of effects on cognition of the sort that matter to moral status.”
(Greene, et. al. 2005) Thus, on this view, cognitive capacity is central to moral
standing, which is different from either phenotypic or genotypic differences
determined by biological assessments. But, even here the problem of threshold
is not clear. Neural grafting has effects that are not immediately evident to the
eye. Biologist William Hurlburt opines that “a visible chimera would veer dan-
gerously off course […] That’s why chimeric creatures are monsters in mythol-
ogy in the first place” (Schreeve, 2005). If recombinant genetics research, i.e.,
specifically primate bioengineering, were able to produce a humanzee that has
visibly human features such as a human face, would this be morally objection-
able? But, if yes, then phenotypic presentation does contribute to moral evalua-
tion (to be distinguished from mere aesthetic or emotional response). And, what
of the so-called gonad quandary? If an animal-nonhuman chimera experiment
really works through the introduction of fully potent human embryonic stem
cells into the very early embryo of a chimpanzee, then “the human cells should
differentiate into all of the embryo’s cell lineages, including the one that even-
tually forms the animal’s reproductive cells” (Schreeve, 2005). Is this research
consequence morally objectionable, given an assortment of other consequences
associated with the resultant chimera’s reproductive success? If yes, then geno-
typic presentation does contribute to moral evaluation.
DeGrazia (2007) and Eberl and Ballard (2009) have engaged in the problem of
such animal research somewhat more carefully. Eberl and Ballard, following
Thomas Aquinas, outline “a metaphysical framework in which to argue how 
a-h [animal-human] chimeras ought to be defined ontologically” (Eberl and 
Ballard, 2009, p. 476 ). For them, “The ontological question at hand, on the
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Thomistic view, is whether an a-h chimeric embryo, through the addition of
human cells, possesses the intrinsic capacity to produce a cerebral cortex that
supports self-conscious rational thought” (p. 476). The key question here is one
of personhood and not mere rational capacity, and specifically whether the ani-
mal-human chimera is no longer the equivalent of a “nonrational sentient ani-
mal” but a rational animal. Thus, Eberl and Ballard argue, 
If certain types of a-h chimeras qualify as persons, then any experiments
that involve their destruction, or otherwise harm them when it is not to
their own benefit, would be impermissible—or at least require stringent
justification—despite whatever other goods may be promoted through
such experimentation. (p. 476)
DeGrazia argues in favour of respect for nonhuman primates and the prohibition
of experimentation on them (2007). He argues, “Great Apes [i.e., chimpanzees,
bonobos, gorillas, orangutans] are so much like paradigm persons with respect
to relevant characteristics that we ought to regard them as our equals in moral sta-
tus” (DeGrazia, 2007, here and for the remaining in-text citations in this para-
graph, pp. 312–321). By “paradigm person” DeGrazia means “normal human
children, adolescents, and adults [who are] characteristically psychologically
complex, linguistically competent, and highly social.” (Great Apes have a
“capacity for intentional action,” displaying “unusual deliberateness, planning,
or reasoning—activities that also indicate a degree of rationality”; they are self-
aware, as well as socially self-aware given their social structures (“long-term
relationships, dominance hierarchies, and shifting allegiances”) and “apparent-
ly altruistic actions that seem neither conditioned nor instinctual.” Thus, on
DeGrazia’s account, “normal, postinfancy Great Apes are borderline persons”.
But, more to the point, DeGrazia’s analysis also links well with Derrida’s ques-
tion of whether an animal suffers; for, as DeGrazia says, “[T]he thesis that all
humans, and only humans, have moral status is undermined by the considered
judgment that cruelty to (sentient) animals is wrong, a judgment whose coher-
ent defense requires attributing some moral status to victims of cruelty” (p. 314).
Great Apes, as sentient borderline persons, possess moral status so as not to be
subjected to cruelty, including cruelty they may undergo as subjects of scientif-
ic experimentation—which is to be prohibited, 
unless (1) their participation is realistically expected to pose no more than
minimal risk to them, or (2) greater risks are justified by the prospect of
direct veterinary benefit to them and the absence of alternatives offering
a better benefit/risk ratio. Moreover, if Great Apes find participation aver-
sive, making clear signs that they don’t want to continue, these communi-
cations should count as dissent and should disqualify the subjects from
further participation—unless they face substantial veterinary need and par-
ticipation in the study is the best hope for meeting it. (p. 325) 
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DeGrazia thereby argues in consequence, “The chimera studies under consider-
ation, which are intended to lead to the growth of human neurons in primate sub-
jects’ brains, would not meet these ethical standards and therefore should be
prohibited” (p. 325).
The discussions of DeGrazia and Eberl and Ballard are important first steps
toward needed discussion, presenting some ways (whether through scholastic or
other metaphysical analysis) to sort out scientific-technological limits of
human/nonhuman animal relations. Nonetheless, the foregoing analysis leads to
one salient conclusion: Only a redetermination of our ethical duty—such that, as
Derrida proposed, this duty is (1) not grounded in mere human self-interest, thus
(2) not grounded in a posit of human right, (3) not driven by some utilitarian
calculus privileging human interest over animal interest, and (4) not grounded in
declarations of ontological-moral status issued in scholastic/religious or late
modern philosophy—would position us reasonably to interrogate the multiplic-
ity of human/nonhuman animal limits. And, without doubt, this interrogation
must occur proactively, if we are to find ourselves responsive to scientific-tech-
nological pathologies generated by ostensibly responsible scientists engaged in
animal experimentation.
The Nuffield Council points to some basic questions that are yet unsettled in
this regard; namely that some make a distinction between animals having life as
an absolute value, such that “it would be wrong deliberately to take a life for
any purpose, even for the saving of a greater number of human lives”; while oth-
ers argue that the life of an animal has intrinsic value, such that “it would be
wrong deliberately to take a life for any purpose without careful justification”
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005, p. 242). The latter view entails what has
been called “forced consequentialist sacrifice,” insofar as animals used in exper-
iment “suffer costs and do not accrue any benefits, while humans receive all the
benefits.” While the debate on the question of absolute vs. intrinsic value con-
tinues, the working group claimed, at the least, by way of a conditional proposi-
tion: “Harmful research involving animals must be morally unacceptable if
animal life is seen as having absolute value, or if forced consequentialist sacri-
fice is always seen as wrong” (p. 242).
Whatever one’s proposed settlement to the foregoing conditional proposition,
before a redetermination of ethical duty can happen as a matter of fact, in con-
trast to what can happen as a matter of discursive deconstruction, one must be
attuned to the requisite comportment. Derrida points to it when he says:
A principle of ethics or more radically of justice, in the most difficult
sense, which I have attempted to oppose to right, to distinguish from right,
is perhaps the obligation that engages my responsibility with respect to the
most dissimilar [les plus dissemblable] […] the entirely other, precisely, the
monstrously other, the unrecognizable other. The “unrecognizable”
[méconnaissable], I shall say in a somewhat elliptical way, is the begin-
ning of ethics, of the Law, and not of the human. So long as there is rec-
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ognizability and fellow, ethics is dormant. It is sleeping a dogmatic slum-
ber. So long as it remains human, among men, ethics remains dogmatic,
narcissistic, and not yet thinking. Not even thinking the human that it talks
so much about. (Derrida, 2009, p. 108)
Like Derrida, Isaac Bashevis Singer (cited above in epigraph) understands what
is at stake here, adding to the clamour that would wake us from our dogmatic
slumber. His words signal that the use/misuse/abuse of animals—even that of
the otherwise wildtype mouse that has been transfigured into a transgenic
chimera—amounts to “an eternal Treblinka,” thus, to geno-cide—even if it is
understood that this type of genocide is measured by a law other than that posit-
ed by the human qua sovereign. For, as Derrida reminds, this sovereign assumes,
without just reason, “the beast [as being] ignorant of right and the sovereign [as]
having the right to suspend right, to place himself above the law that he is, that
he makes, that he institutes, as to which he decides, sovereignly” (p. 32).
In all humanist logic to date, “There is no ‘crime against animality’ nor crime of
genocide against nonhuman living beings”—i.e., no such crime as a matter of
human delimitation of “right” [droit] (p. 110). But, if we have learned anything
from Derrida’s deconstructive engagement of sovereignty in relation to this
humanist logic, it is that the human must, as a matter of ethical duty (in Derri-
da’s sense of ethics) dispossess himself of this expropriation, as a matter of jus-
tice due to all animals, howsoever dissimilar. Derrida admonishes: “Having
doubts about responsibility, decision, one’s own being-ethical, can be, or so it
seems to me, and ought perhaps to remain, the indefeasible essence of ethics, of
decision, and of responsibility” (p. 119). Foreswearing the modern humanist log-
ics, then, to be a scientist responsibly, to be a bioethicist responsibly, each must
keep be guided not by the obligation of non-maleficence as the first of princi-
ples in biomedical ethics, but rather, in a world of heightened scientific-techno-
logical pathologies generated by the biomedical sciences, the architectonic rule
to endure the undecidable.
In that context, the Incompleteness Theorem of Bioethics holds that: (A) In any
well-formed theory of the ethical, the truth of some moral propositions is unde-
cidable within the frame of the theory, in which case (B) it is obligatory that one
endure the undecidable as undecidable, rather than posit a simulacrum of truth
that, in consequence, violates the principle of non-maleficence that applies to all
living beings 8.
This theorem—which accounts for postmodern critiques of modern founda-
tionalist, systematic philosophy, thus also of the systematic approach in modern
moral philosophy—imposes a limit to human claims to knowledge, and therefore
an insuperable limit to the human claim to sovereignty over the beast. Thereby,
the political-philosophical and onto-theological traditional problématique that
Derrida has surveyed is displaced in the interest of both humans and animals in
all their diversity and multiplicity. This means, for bioethics, and for biomedical
research involving animal experimentation in particular, a reassessment of what
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it means to be cruel to animals beyond the current regulatory structure that is
grounded, objectionably, in utilitarian calculations of human interest. This means,
then, with reference to the case examples illustrated above, that rather than have
such experiments approved and even considered approvable via the regulatory
apparatus now in place, such research protocols should have been allocated to the
undecidable, with the ethics review committees sustaining this undecidability
and thereby ruling such experiments not permissible, in deference to the lack of
justification that is to be found in a fable as opposed to in real, scientific knowl-
edge.
With this theorem we stand at “the threshold of responsibility” that Derrida
would have us interrogate. Thus standing, moved by a deconstructive thinking,
we must think, without knowing, 
that we don’t even consider the existence (whether natural or artificial) of
any threshold to be secure, if by “threshold” is meant either an indivisible
frontier line or the solidity of a foundational ground. Supposing that we
dwelled on the threshold, we would also have [to] endure the ordeal of
feeling the earthquake always underway, threatening the existence of every
threshold, threatening both its indivisibility and its foundational solidity.
(p. 310) 
Thus we have all the more reason to endure the undecidable—and from there, in
the pursuit of the good, to begin to sort out “the best practicable” when we can-
not have “the best” of human/nonhuman animal relations. And, importantly, the
best practicable is ever a function of the defeasibility of the assortment of propo-
sitions we seek to advance, whether empirical or philosophical.
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NOTES
1 See Chapter 1, Reading Selection: “Forward” [sic, “Foreword”], Roots of the Holocaust, Sep-
tember 16, 2005, in Professor Michael Bazyler (Whittier Law School) and Professor Stephen
Feinstein (University of Minnesota), Holocaust, Genocide and the Law (HGAL Reader),
Spring 2006. In their course reader on “Holocaust, Genocide and the Law,” Bazyler and Fein-
stein cite the “Foreword” of Roots of the Holocaust concerning “the earliest known case of the
word [holocaust] having been applied to the actions of the Nazi regime.” It is reported that
Newsweek used the word with reference to “the mass burning of banned books by the Nazi
government in May 1933,” i.e., “a holocaust of books,” thus without any reference to Nazi
genocide of Jews (which, of course, is historically posterior to this date). Further, it is assert-
ed here that Jonathan Petrie “demonstrates conclusively that ‘holocaust’ […] had, long before
the rise of the Nazis, an extensive history of being used to describe both natural and manmade
catastrophes, and that its application to the Shoah was neither unique nor a product—as some-
times claimed—of theologized notions of the murder of millions of Jews” (p. 20). Thus, as a
concept within the history of ideas, “holocaust” cannot be restricted to the denotation it has
been assigned, i.e., the Nazi genocide of the Jews (thus to the Jewish Hebrew descriptor,
Shoah), even as “genocide” has broader reference than this historical event. Given this account
of “holocaust” and its association/correlation to “genocide” in the context of Nazi genocide,
Derrida may reasonably broaden the concept of genocide (geno-cide) to include human
use/misuse/abuse of nonhuman animals. (See also Patterson, 2002)
2 In “Violence Against Animals,” Derrida says: “While tremendous progress is being made in
primatology, this progress is not receiving the attention it deserves. It describes, in a direct and
sometimes astounding way, extremely refined forms of symbolic organization: work of mourn-
ing and of burial, family structures, avoidance if not prohibition of incest, etc.” In this regard,
see de Waal, Frans. “Our Inner Ape: What Primate Behavior Tells Us About Human Nature,”
Invited Keynote Address. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjQkwldlfm; also de Waal, 2006;
de Waal, 2009.3
3 See Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, transl. by the English Dominican Fathers.
New York, Benzger Brothers, 1928, book 3, part 2, ch. 112.
4 See American Psychological Association, “Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in the Care and
Use of Animals”, http://www.apa.org/science/leadership/care/guidelines.aspx
5 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Ethical Issues: Is it morally acceptable to cause pain, suf-
fering and death to animals?” http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/animal-research/animal-
research-ethical-issues
6 See Jarvis, S., J. E. L. Day, and B. Reed. “Ethical Guidelines for Research in Animal 
Science,” British Society of Animal Science. http://www.bsas.org.uk/downloads/ Ethical-
guidelines_website.pdf
7 To be fair to him, in this contrast with Derrida, Singer does say (in “Morality, Reason and the
Rights of Animals,” that “[u]nless there is some compensating benefit […] we should consider
similar experiences of pain to be equally bad, whatever the species of the being who feels the
pain.”
8 Those familiar with the philosophy of mathematics will recognize here my adaptation of
Gödel’s theorem.
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